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-rw-r--r--examples/redis-unstable/modules/vector-sets/mixer.h106
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 106 deletions
diff --git a/examples/redis-unstable/modules/vector-sets/mixer.h b/examples/redis-unstable/modules/vector-sets/mixer.h
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--- a/examples/redis-unstable/modules/vector-sets/mixer.h
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@@ -1,106 +0,0 @@
-/* Redis implementation for vector sets. The data structure itself
- * is implemented in hnsw.c.
- *
- * Copyright (c) 2009-Present, Redis Ltd.
- * All rights reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under your choice of (a) the Redis Source Available License 2.0
- * (RSALv2); or (b) the Server Side Public License v1 (SSPLv1); or (c) the
- * GNU Affero General Public License v3 (AGPLv3).
- * Originally authored by: Salvatore Sanfilippo.
- *
- * =============================================================================
- *
- * Mixing function for HNSW link integrity verification
- * Designed to resist collision attacks when salts are unknown.
- */
-
-#include <stdint.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-static inline uint64_t ROTL64(uint64_t x, int r) {
- return (x << r) | (x >> (64 - r));
-}
-
-// Use more rounds and stronger constants
-#define MIX_PRIME_1 0xFF51AFD7ED558CCDULL
-#define MIX_PRIME_2 0xC4CEB9FE1A85EC53ULL
-#define MIX_PRIME_3 0x9E3779B97F4A7C15ULL
-#define MIX_PRIME_4 0xBF58476D1CE4E5B9ULL
-#define MIX_PRIME_5 0x94D049BB133111EBULL
-#define MIX_PRIME_6 0x2B7E151628AED2A7ULL
-
-/* Mixer design goals:
- * 1. Thorough mixing of the level parameter.
- * 2. Enough rounds of mixing.
- * 3. Cross-influence between h1 and h2.
- * 4. Domain separation to prevent related-key attacks.
- */
-void secure_pair_mixer_128(uint64_t salt0, uint64_t salt1,
- uint64_t id1_in, uint64_t id2_in, uint64_t level,
- uint64_t* out_h1, uint64_t* out_h2) {
- // Order independence (A -> B links should hash as B -> A links).
- uint64_t id_a = (id1_in < id2_in) ? id1_in : id2_in;
- uint64_t id_b = (id1_in < id2_in) ? id2_in : id1_in;
-
- // Domain separation: mix salts with a constant to prevent
- // related-key attacks.
- uint64_t h1 = salt0 ^ 0xDEADBEEFDEADBEEFULL;
- uint64_t h2 = salt1 ^ 0xCAFEBABECAFEBABEULL;
-
- // First, thoroughly mix the level into both accumulators
- // This prevents predictable level values from being a weakness
- uint64_t level_mix = level;
- level_mix *= MIX_PRIME_5;
- level_mix ^= level_mix >> 32;
- level_mix *= MIX_PRIME_6;
-
- h1 ^= level_mix;
- h2 ^= ROTL64(level_mix, 31);
-
- // Mix in id_a with strong diffusion.
- h1 ^= id_a;
- h1 *= MIX_PRIME_1;
- h1 = ROTL64(h1, 23);
- h1 *= MIX_PRIME_2;
-
- // Mix in id_b.
- h2 ^= id_b;
- h2 *= MIX_PRIME_3;
- h2 = ROTL64(h2, 29);
- h2 *= MIX_PRIME_4;
-
- // Three rounds of cross-mixing for better security.
- for (int i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
- // Cross-influence.
- uint64_t tmp = h1;
- h1 += h2;
- h2 += tmp;
-
- // Mix h1.
- h1 ^= ROTL64(h1, 31);
- h1 *= MIX_PRIME_1;
- h1 ^= salt0;
-
- // Mix h2.
- h2 ^= ROTL64(h2, 37);
- h2 *= MIX_PRIME_2;
- h2 ^= salt1;
- }
-
- // Finalization with avalanche rounds.
- h1 ^= h1 >> 33;
- h1 *= MIX_PRIME_3;
- h1 ^= h1 >> 29;
- h1 *= MIX_PRIME_4;
- h1 ^= h1 >> 32;
-
- h2 ^= h2 >> 33;
- h2 *= MIX_PRIME_5;
- h2 ^= h2 >> 29;
- h2 *= MIX_PRIME_6;
- h2 ^= h2 >> 32;
-
- *out_h1 = h1;
- *out_h2 = h2;
-}